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The Four Causes of ADHD: Aristotle
in the Classroom
Marino Pérez-Álvarez*
Department of Psychology, University of Oviedo, Oviedo, Spain
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is one of the most well-established and
at the same time controversial disorders to the extreme of being placed in doubt. In the
first of two parts, the established position is critically reviewed, beginning with showing
fallacious reasoning on which the diagnosis is based, lacking clinical proof. Similarly, a
certain rhetoric and metaphysics in genetic and neurobiological research is highlighted,
where, for example, a meager accumulation of data is offered as robust conclusions, and
correlates and correlations as causes and bases. However, that may be, the controversy
is silenced in a dialog of the deaf between “defenders” and “critics.” with no way out
in sight in empirical and scientific terms. A new meta-scientific position is necessary
to analyze the science of ADHD itself and its social uses. In this respect, the second
part introduces Aristotle’s four causes, material, formal, efficient, final, as an instrument
of enquiry. According to this analysis, ADHD is not the pretended clinical entity as
presented, but a practical entity providing a variety of functions. The implications would
be rather different from the usual.
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INTRODUCTION
This article takes a critical look at the established conception of what is called “Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder” (ADHD). The established concept presents ADHD as a
neurodevelopment disorder with a highly inheritable genetic origin which begins in infancy and
frequently continues into adulthood. This concept forms part of the beginning of most articles on
ADHD, as an already familiar rhetoric suggestive of something well-established by consensus.
However, the even authors arguing the standard concept recognize the controversy concerning
its clinical entity, perhaps just another aspect of its rhetoric. The truth is that there is also extensive
literature questioning the clinical medical-scientific validity of ADHD. The controversy may be
reduced to two opposite positions: the standard, which states its well-established existence, such
that denying it would be like denying that the Earth is round, and the critical, which denies its
clinical entity, such that those who argue for it would only be pathologizing normal behaviors and
problems. A third position, apparently between them, is limited to criticizing overdiagnosis and
overmedication, but is still a variant of the standard concept.
Although the controversy is incessant, it does not seem to go any further in the usual terms
of whether ADHD exists or not. The critical position cannot just deny its existence under the
assumption that it is an “invention” of the pharmaceutical industry or the bio-power that be or
whatever. Not because it is an invention would it no longer constitute a factual, practical, and
institutional reality. The question would be what does exist. However, those who argue for ADHD
cannot do so only with ambiguous rhetoric and questionable implicit assumptions. The question
here would be why they are as genuinely convinced as they are of such a controversial position.
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The controversy cannot be resolved in empirical scientific
terms, on the plane of facts, as if the facts spoke for themselves,
which is where it now stands. A metascientific, philosophical
assessment is required, with an ontological scope asking what
ADHD is, and epistemological scope asking how science itself
knows and molds what has ended up as the actual “ADHD.”
This approach is based on a critical position (not ingenuous)
concerning the impressive neuroscientific evidence claimed
as support for the established concept. Such an approach is
unthinkable for those who assume the standard concept, given
their amazement that anyone would deny it. Without denying
their data, light will be shed on the rhetoric and metaphysics that
sustain it. If the rhetoric suggests more persuasive than truthful
reasoning, metaphysics refers here to implicit assumptions about
genetics and the brain which go beyond what genomics and
brain connectomics really permit. The article has two parts. The
first concentrates on revealing the rhetoric and metaphysics of
ADHD neuroscience. The second develops the metascientific
approach beyond the usual controversy – whether or not it
exists – attempting instead to understand what it is that exists
and how it came to be that way.
RHETORIC AND METAPHYSICS OF THE
ADHD NEUROSCIENCE
Instead of uncritically assuming the standard ADHD concept as if
scientific evidence required it, we review its consistency, focusing
on the rhetoric and metaphysics on which it is largely based.
Its three basic pillars, diagnosis, genetics, and neurobiology, are
specifically reviewed.
How to Make a Diagnosis with Fallacious
Reasoning (with Tautologies)
Everything begins and has its basis in the diagnostic criteria
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). For the case in
hand, it does not matter whether the International Classification
of Diseases (ICD; World Health Organization, 1992) is used.
It is the DSM/ICD diagnostic systems themselves which are
questioned as a valid basis for making diagnoses. Suffice it to cite
in this respect the critical position of two international psychiatric
organizations. The first is the statement by Thomas Insel on April
29, 2013, as Director of the National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH), that the Institute was not going to use the DSM-5
criteria at the point of being released, as in fact it was in May the
same year, due to its lack of validity. As Insel (2013) states:
The strength of each of the editions of DSM has been “reliability” –
each edition has ensured that clinicians use the same terms in
the same ways. The weakness is its lack of validity. Unlike our
definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the
DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical
symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure.
The Critical Psychiatry Network, an organization of critical
psychiatrists who focus on a biomedical approach in psychiatry,
has promoted a campaign under the slogan, “No more psychiatric
labels” for abolition of the DSM/ICD, also on the basis of its lack
of validity (Timimi, 2014).
The DSM may have improved reliability with regard to
consistency among those who apply it, but validity is something
else: its correctness and robustness for making a diagnosis.
A Marcia Angell, ex-director of the New England Journal of
Medicine says about psychiatric diagnoses:
If nearly all physicians agreed that freckles were a sign of cancer,
the diagnosis would be “reliable,” but not valid. The problem with
the DSM is that in all of its editions, it has simply reflected the
opinions of its writers (Angell, 2011).
The diagnostic criteria are established by consensual opinion.
But the consensus reveals that there is no evidence. If there had
been scientific evidence, a consensus would not be necessary.
What more can be said when many of the experts in the
consensus are plagued with conflicts of interest and a laboratory
in the field funds the meetings (Kooij et al., 2010)? These
statements of consensus are upheld by the superabundant
bibliography on ADHD, like someone who grabs hold of a
lamppost to keep standing up without using it to see by. One
consensus cites over 500 references (Barkley, 2002), like bulk
evidence by accumulation, without reviewing it to see if it really
is accumulated knowledge. Another uses 320 references to back
its validity (Kooij et al., 2010), without really being clear, firm
evidence. The statements of consensus assume a subtly deceitful
argument consisting of citing quantities of studies, without any of
them being conclusive, which in the end are taken as convergent,
promising support. A collection of promising support turns
into evidence. For example, after recognizing the challenge of a
“diagnosis being based on reported symptoms alone; there are
no biological tests” (Thapar and Cooper, 2016, p. 1241), ADHD
becomes in the conclusions a “robust and consistent across design
type and sample. There are established assessment methods”
(Thapar and Cooper, 2016, p. 1247).
The truth is that the diagnosis of ADHD is established,
but based on fallacious reasoning, typically two (Tait, 2009):
the Affirming the Consequent Fallacy and Begging the Question
Fallacy. According to the affirming the consequent fallacy, if
the child “often fails to give close attention to details,” “often
fidgets with or taps hands or squirms in seat”. . . (statements
in the DSM-5 criteria) then he has ADHD. According to the
begging the question fallacy it is already known that the child
has ADHD because he/she “often fails to give close attention to
details,” “often fidgets with or taps hands or squirms in seat,”
and so on. The child does not pay attention and fidgets because
he/she has ADHD and he/she has ADHD because he does not
pay attention and fidgets. The symptoms are the guarantee of
the diagnostic category, which in turn is invoked to explain
the symptoms in an endless loop (Brinkmann, 2014b, p. 128).
The diagnostic category is molded in the process of making the
diagnosis of the case. In turn, the diagnosis of the case sustains
the clinical category without other independent tests or genetic
evidence or neurobiology of diagnostic value as discussed below.
The Non-Sequitur Fallacy, which assumes that if the medication
(typically stimulants) reduces hyperactivity, the hyperactivity is a
symptom and ADHD is a disorder, also commonly occurs. But
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one does not follow the other, not logically and not empirically,
since stimulants produce the same effect whether you have
ADHD or not.
The diagnosis is based on fallacious reasoning, not on
clinical tests as would be expected in view of how sure the
affirmations are. Based on DSM/ICD diagnosis, a series of
objective, complementary, and supposedly confirmatory tests
are being studied. Among the most objective is the Test
of Variables of Attention (TOVA), a continuous performance
test (CPT) (Fried et al., 2014; Rodríguez et al., 2016). The
TOVA presents a computerized task which evaluates omissions,
commissions, reaction times, variability, and post-commission
response times. Apart from the scant ecological validity as a task
little representative of daily situations, the biggest problem with
the TOVA is its inadequate specificity, leading to false positives
and false negatives: children not ADHD who “fail” and ADHD
children who do well (Zelnik et al., 2012; Fried et al., 2014).
The problem of ecological validity can be reduced with virtual
reality tests. However, up to now support is limited (Negut¸ et al.,
2016). Virtual reality tests, even though they show sensitivity, also
lack diagnostic specificity due to variability and overlapping of
the measures (Areces et al., 2016; Negut¸ et al., 2016). In fact, the
TOVA, whether or not in virtual reality, is applied to children
already differentiated by the DSM diagnostic criteria: children
with ADHD or without ADHD, not as a diagnostic test itself.
These tests can be useful for evaluating attention skills, precision
or reaction times, which may be relevant in themselves without
presupposing ADHD. They measure what they measure, but it
could not be said that the ADHD is measured.
On the basis of the self-interested consensus that may be
assumed from declared conflicts of interest and sponsorship of
commissioned work (Barkley, 2002; Kooij et al., 2010; Faraone
et al., 2015), inconsistent conclusions (Thapar and Cooper, 2016)
and fallacious reasoning (Tait, 2009), surprisingly, or perhaps
not, the sentence, as dogmatic as antiscientific, is that doubting
ADHD would be like “declaring the Earth flat, the laws of
gravity debatable, and the periodic table in chemistry a fraud”
(Barkley, 2002, p. 90). According to Timimi et al. (2004) in
his comment on this consensus, “It is regrettable that they
wish to close down debate prematurely and in a way not
becoming of academics. The evidence shows that the debate
is far from over” (Timimi et al., 2004, p. 63). Even without
assuming intentionality due to conflicts of interest in establishing
a consensus, its unintentional influence through default brain-
centered thinking cannot be discarded, as mentioned further
below.
How to Make Genetics Seem Like
Evidence (with Ambiguities)
Beyond the diagnosis, one fundamental aspect of the ADHD
rhetoric is its consideration as a highly inheritable genetic
disorder (Tarver et al., 2014; Gallo and Posner, 2016; Thapar and
Cooper, 2016). If the diagnosis is, as it is, based on a consensus
dominated by conflicts of interest more than on tests, lacking in
validity and more than anything else tautological, it is going to be
hard for there to be specific genetic and neurobiological bases.
The reviews show two things: the non-existence of real
molecular genetic evidence and the persistence in their
affirmation. We refer here to reviews by authors who are not
precisely critical of the genetic perspective, but as scientists are
compelled to recognize what there is, not without their rhetoric.
Thus Cortese, after reviewing the convergence of different
approaches (none conclusive), refers to the future, “It is expected
that future research will reveal similarly exciting convergent
findings” (Cortese, 2012, p. 430). Thapar and Cooper (2016,
p. 1242) recognize that “ADHD-associated genomic variants are
non-specific.” A study by Thapar himself and others found that
14% of children diagnosed with ADHD had a rare chromosomic
difference known as “copy number variants” compared to 7% of
children not diagnosed with ADHD who also had it (Williams
et al., 2010). Although the finding was magnified by emphasizing
double the chromosome rarity in ADHD (13.95% over 7.4%)
and was even taken as “direct evidence that ADHD is a genetic
disorder” (Wellcome Trust, 2010), the truth is that 86% of
children with ADHD did not have this rarity and 7% of those
without ADHD did.
Tarver et al. (2014, p. 763) likewise acknowledge that
“Genomic-wide searches have yet to identify a single candidate
gene,” although they add that “This is probably due to insufficient
sample sizes to date.” However, as suggested by Sonuga-Barke
(2010, p. 113), “We are now using larger and larger samples of
patients to demonstrate smaller and smaller molecular genetic
main effects.” As Thapar et al. (2013) admit in their conclusions:
The genetic risks implicated in ADHD generally tend to have
small effect sizes or be rare and often increase risk of many
other types of psychopathology. Thus, they cannot be used for
prediction, genetic testing or diagnostic purposes beyond what is
predicted by a family history” (Thapar et al., 2013, p. 3).
Gallo and Posner (2016) also recognize the scant genetic
evidence, but not without inconsistent rhetoric between what
they affirm and what they really find. They state that “ADHD is
a highly heritable disorder” (Gallo and Posner, 2016, p. 558) to
continue by saying, “Despite substantial evidence for a genetic
origin of ADHD, specific genes or sets of genes causally linked
to the disorder have yet to be discovered” (p. 559). This rhetoric
of inconsistencies continues when they say, “Substantial progress
has been made in clarifying the complex genetic architecture of
ADHD, yet the mismatch between the high heritability estimates
and weak associations between ADHD and specific genetic
markers is puzzling” (p. 560). After all, they feel obliged to admit
that “Although candidate genes and neuro transmitter systems
have been implicated in ADHD, genome-wide associations
between ADHD and individual genetic variants have yet to be
found” (p. 563).
The claimed heritability in ADHD is based on statistical data,
not on genetic data as such. It often refers to ADHD running in
the family and to the higher coincidence in monozygotic than in
dizygotic twins. Many things run in the family, such as an accent
in language or religion without therefore being genetic. Identical
twins share more environmental conditions than non-identical
twins so this and other “twin method” reasons do not enable the
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genetic-environmental knot to be unraveled, much less talk about
percentages (Joseph, 2015).
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder may be hereditary,
but not therefore genetic. Of the four ways of inheritance,
genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and cultural (Jablonka and Lamb,
2005), genetic is probably the least expectable in transmitting
ADHD-type behavioral traits. It is not among the functions
of genes to generate behavioral traits. The metaphors “code”
and “program” have seduced the imagination of scientists,
professionals and people in general so they sound like genes do
more than they really do. As development resources, more than
deterministic “programs,” everything related to genes depends
on the context, from cellular, extracellular, embryonal, and
intrauterine to perinatal and social, from womb to tomb. Recent
research in epigenetic and genomic plasticity causes genes to
be reconceived beyond their traditional conception as agents
instructing traits (González-Pardo and Pérez Álvarez, 2013). The
new conception means a change in genes to genome (including
non-codifying matter) and of action to reaction referred to
genome reactivity as a dynamic system “exquisitely sensitive” to
signals in both the organism’s immediate intracellular context
and external environment as a whole (Keller, 2014, p. 2428). The
genome mediates adaptation and response to the environment;
it does not cause response and adaptive action. As Keller (2014,
p. 2427) says:
In addition to providing information required for building and
maintaining an organism, the genome also provides a vast
amount of information enabling it to adapt and respond to the
environment in which it finds itself.
For lack of firm evidence, the defense of ADHD genetics
at all costs is served by rhetoric, with two formulas, one
consisting of saying that ADHD is a “heterogeneous,”
“multifactorial,” or “complex” disorder, and the other
emphasizing “gene–environment interaction.”
Talking about “heterogeneous,” “multifactorial,” or “complex”
in psychiatry is synonymous today with lack of specific genetic
evidence (Joseph, 2009, p. 72). These expressions sneakily suggest
the genetic condition of a disorder by implying a complicated
involvement of numerous genes, with no more evidence than thin
correlational associations. But an association is not causation. For
lack of precise and specific evidence, the genetic argument of
ADHD becomes a loop. As Pittelli (2002) says when commenting
on a meta-analysis, “The argument that ADHD is “mediated by
many genes acting in concert” is rather circular in that it is based
primarily on the complete failure of molecular genetic studies
to find such genes and replicate those findings” (Pittelli, 2002).
ADHD is still “complex” even without thinking about genes.
The commonly referred to gene–environment interaction also
insinuates that there is more than there really is: supposed
genes interacting with the environment. The formula here is
sibylline, as deceitful as it is hard to contradict. Nevertheless, two
arguments must be considered.
In the first place, if the ADHD genes are not identified,
and they are not, then it is going to be hard to talk sensibly
about their interaction. What are we talking about when we
discuss interaction? Are the genes active agents able to interact
following a “program” or “code” for some behavioral trait?
What specific interactions are in play if not even the ADHD
phenotype is well-defined? Endophenotypes supposedly closer to
genetic influences, such as reaction times, response inhibition
or working memory, are also discussed. But research shows
that endophenotypes lack specificity for the ADHD phenotype
itself (Gallo and Posner, 2016). Endophenotypes are expected
to “increase statistical power to identify relevant associations
between genes and neurobiological mechanisms,” but they
remain “a promising route” (Gallo and Posner, 2016, p. 560); the
new promise, not cold hard findings.
The second argument says the gene–environment or biology-
culture dichotomy itself loses sense in genomic times (Keller,
2012, 2014). It no longer makes sense to talk about interaction
as of two preexisting things that enter into interaction
(gene–environment) and much less percentages of heritability.
What research in genomics has shown is that biology itself is
constituted by those interactions, and is so constituted at every
level, even at the level of genetics. Indeed, one might say that
what makes a molecule—any molecule—biological is precisely
its capacity to sense and react to its environment (Keller, 2012,
p. 139).
The reactivity inherent in biological systems enables
development to be understood as a set of cells with their multiple
molecules, functioning in mutual concert for a certain result, not
thereby executing a central program (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 74).
According to this conception of development, it is hard to argue
the conception of genes as “instructor agents” or “instructions” of
traits which some day, for example, at school age, or in adult life,
will be “expressed” as ADHD behavior. What persistent genetic
research really underlines is the decisive role of environment in
the development of mental disorders (Sonuga-Barke, 2010). It
no longer makes sense to talk about percentages. Nature itself,
constituting organisms in their continuous interactions, places
us beyond typical topical percentages.
The tangled nature of genetics and the environment, even in
genetic conditions such as diabetes, keeps heritability from being
unpacked, or from there being any interest in doing so (Chaufan,
2008). To begin with, heritability in its technical sense is an
attribute of a population, not of individual traits. Furthermore,
organisms and phenotypes are non-additive products of genes, in
an historic sequence of development environments and chance
events, so their interdependence impedes any empirical or
statistical quantification of the “ingredients” in this mixture.
Empirically, the genetic-environmental percentage could be
established in breeding animals and in agriculture, from which
statistical techniques are derived, enabling quantification that
makes sense under controlled conditions. But statistical analyses
(typically analysis of variance) are not analyses of causes, and
therefore do not permit understanding what caused a disorder
in an individual (Chaufan, 2008, pp. 21, 35). The problem of
heritability is not resolved with larger samples (Chaufan, 2008,
p. 37), as in the promise of the overused genetic perspective
(Thapar et al., 2013, p. 7; Tarver et al., 2014, p. 763; Gallo and
Posner, 2016, pp. 559–560). It has already seen in schizophrenia,
a clinically well-established disorder (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2016),
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unlike ADHD, how larger samples of thousands of patients do
not lead to stronger genetic associations (Ross, 2016; Sekar et al.,
2016).
While the concept of hereditability is confusing at least, for
understanding the category, it lacks application to individuals.
Even if there were “ADHD genes,” predisposition does not imply
availability of the phenotype, according to epigenetic chance
(González-Pardo and Pérez Álvarez, 2013; Dillon and Craven,
2014; Mukherjee, 2016).
Quantification of heritability has little to offer for
understanding ADHD. According to Chaufan (2008), the
genetic emphasis may even be harmful to the extent that it
diverts public attention and research funding from the social
determinants, which are decisive in the end, even in genetic
conditions such as diabetes. There may be more science policy
than science itself in pursuance of genetics, concerning interests
and status of the authors involved, beginning with the hegemony
of the biomedical model.
How to Make Causes Out of Correlations
and Correlates (by Calling Them
“Bases”)
A critical position must also be adopted regarding ADHD as
a disorder of neurodevelopment, as presented in its standard
packaging, instead of simply assuming it without further
consideration. The literature in favor of the neurodevelopment
approach is undeniably enormous and the amount of data
overwhelming. However, the data do not speak for themselves,
but by the perspective in which they are taken. In an uncritical
neurodevelopment perspective which places the brain under
spotlights as if it were the place the keys to ADHD should be
found, data providing feedback for this search are not lacking
nor will they be. Things always happen in the brain related to the
activities of organisms. It would be of concern if it were not. As
more and more sensitive measurements of the brain’s functioning
become available, neural correlates of the activities selected are
found more easily. Another thing is the relevance of the findings
and the meaning of the correlation: causal and in what direction,
or artefactual due to third factors involved.
A brain-centered approach like the one predominating
research and propagated for ADHD incurs easily in two biases:
a tunnel effect in which one looks in only one direction and
a zoom effect which magnifies what is seen. A new panoramic
and even telescopic approach is necessary which puts the brain
in its place: in the body of a subject who behaves within a
context and who sees from a distance what is known without
becoming “stuck” to the data. Without doubt, more and more
is known about the brain due to the new technologies and
concepts of its functioning, but not because of this is more
known about ADHD, as it has been demonstrated that in spite
of everything, its status is still controversial. There is a mountain
of data, that is, an enormous amount has been accumulated, but
it cannot be said that it is really the solid, accumulative scientific
knowledge with which research progresses. After all, there are no
“diagnostic neurobiological markers” (Thapar and Cooper, 2016,
p. 1243), the “underlying mechanisms” are unknown (Cortese,
2012, p. 2) and in general, “findings from neurobiological
research do not have a direct application in daily clinical practice,”
(Cortese, 2012, p. 9).
The variability and inconsistency of the findings may be
reflecting the heterogeneity and lack of entity of the so-called
“ADHD.” As Beare et al. (2016) say of their own findings:
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder is an extremely
heterogeneous disorder, with few common findings across
studies. The variability in findings resulting from methodological
decisions in this study illustrates the caution that must be taken
in relating network differences to underlying neurobiology.
Neurobiological research is moving from focusing on
brain areas toward dysfunctions in circuits distributed
throughout the brain, leading to the new concept of
“pathoconnectomics” (Cao et al., 2015). Pathoconnectomics
assumes that major psychiatric disorders (e.g., ADHD) involve
abnormalities of brain networks and that understanding
the aberrant organization of brain networks is critical for
understanding these brain disorders (Cao et al., 2015, p. 2802).
Connectomics combines the study of structural connectivity
between regions and functional connectivity consisting of
synchronies of remote neuronal activities (Cao et al., 2015).
A set of sophisticated mathematical techniques and functional
magnetic resonance imaging along with the more conventional
electroencephalography/hemoencephalography and infrared
spectroscopy, enable a new topology and cartography of the
brain (Rodríguez et al., 2011; Cao et al., 2015).
Both regional and general wiring impairments have been
found in ADHD. Among the regional impairments, are
volumetric reductions in the basal ganglia and abnormalities in
cortical thickness in frontal and parietotemporal brain regions
(Gallo and Posner, 2016, p. 556). In functional connectivity,
one “of the more commonly reported abnormalities is reduced
connectivity within the default mode network (DMN)” (Gallo
and Posner, 2016, p. 557). DMN is a set of areas in the brain
described in 2001 which is associated with mental processes at
rest or wandering when one is not busy in some concrete external
task (Raichle, 2015).
The hypothesis is that persistent activity of the DMN can
interfere with the cognitive control network (CCN) involved
in executive functions. Another hypothesis is that individuals
with ADHD may have weaker connectivity in DMN when at
rest, suggesting immaturity and atypical development. The two
networks, DMN/CCN, seem to work in opposite directions in
attentional tasks, “As attentional demands increase, activation
of the CCN increases, whereas DMN activation decreases;
conversely, during periods of internally focused cognitions,
activation in the CCN is reduced, and DMN activation increases”
(Gallo and Posner, 2016, p. 558). Interplay of correlative
transitions would mean normal, mature and typical development.
Four considerations must be made before or instead of taking
the neurodevelopment brain-centered perspective automatically,
by default, as if there were no other option.
In the first place, the neurodevelopment approach leads to
establishing a dichotomy between typical, normal or mature
development and atypical, abnormal or immature development
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defining a psychiatric disorder (Cao et al., 2015). This dichotomy
could be induced by the logic of the approach itself more than
anything else, with its tunnel and zoom effects, selecting and
magnifying some things and leaving others out. If individuals
are selected for certain more or less conspicuous characteristics
and taken to extremes with respect to others who do not have
them, more or less associated neuronal correlates could appear
depending on how well defined those characteristics are. Take
the conditions of being a taxi driver or a non-taxi driver, or a
musician or non-musician. As studies show, the brains of taxi
drivers and musicians show alterations in specific areas and
connections associated with their activities compared to those
who are not (Maguire et al., 2006; Hyde et al., 2009). Now it could
be said that taxi drivers and musicians develop an “atypical” brain
compared to non-taxi drivers and non-musicians, who after all,
make up the majority of the population, and would develop a
“typical” brain. There might also be subtypes: Subtype pianist and
subtype violinist and who knows whether subtypes of London,
Bombay or small-town taxi drivers.
In fact, as a second consideration, the supposed “neuronal
bases” for ADHD do not consist of anything but correlations
and correlates. They are “associations,” which however, implicitly
suggest neuronal causes as “bases” (Rubia et al., 2014, p. 532),
when not explicitly (Gallo and Posner, 2016; Rodríguez et al.,
2016). Thus, Gallo and Posner (2016), after warning about the
“limitations of correlational research” (p. 561) and “caution in
imputing causality” (p. 563), in the end are thinking about
mapping “causal pathways from genes to neural circuits to
symptoms” (p. 564). Rodríguez et al. (2016, p. 8), on the
other hand, argue for a “causal model” based on explicit
assumptions required by the “structural equation modeling”
which they use when they refer to the “direct effect” of cortex
activation of variables measured by the TOVA as an ADHD
index.
As a third consideration, in a discussion of causal directions,
it would be more coherent, both in conceptual terms based
on brain plasticity and empirical terms related to correlations
and correlates found, to argue for the opposite hypothesis,
that behaviors themselves are the causes of the correlates
or neuron “alterations” found. It would be more coherent
to understand cerebral variations as “dependent variables” of
the activities that organisms carry out in their environment
than as causal “independent variables.” The brain changes and
adapts in line with an organism’s activities depending on the
requirements of the environment. The neuron correlates or
brain “alterations” of the taxi drivers and musicians are not
the cause of driving taxis or playing the piano or the violin.
The explanation which Rodríguez et al. (2011) themselves offer
in the case of measuring blood flow activated in the brain by
cognitive tasks and educational exercises is coherent with this
causal direction. After subjects are instructed to make mental
calculations, oxygenated hemoglobin in their blood increases. As
the authors say:
This approach, combined with educational exercises as
brain-training, can maximize blood oxygenation directly in
certain areas of the brain (Rodríguez et al., 2011, p. 66).
Beyond the ADHD cortex causal model assumed by
“structural equations” (Rodríguez et al., 2016), the real causation
seems to be from the behaviors to the brain (Rodríguez et al.,
2011).
Convergent evidence, to use the rhetoric in vogue, is found
in the abundant literature showing that ADHD behavior can
be modified by exercises and behavioral training, which is
hardly understandable if it has a neurological cause and genetic
origin. Furthermore, normalization of the brain, which is usually
referred to after medication with stimulants (Rubia et al., 2014,
p. 529), could be due to its effect on behavior, and it would
really be the change in behavior that is promoting change in
the brain, something suggested by the authors themselves when
they cite a study in which 4 weeks of training in juggling
induced relevant changes in the brain (Rubia et al., 2014,
p. 529).
A last consideration concerns how the neurodevelopment
model reflects the problem of ADHD in real life in the brain
space, both scientific related to its entity, and ethical referring
to the evaluation involved. Thus the reviews still warn of
continuous ambiguities and inconsistencies, no matter how
interested they are in finding accumulated knowledge (Rubia
et al., 2014, p. 523; Gallo and Posner, 2016, pp. 558, 560). These
neurobiological ambiguities and inconsistencies probably reflect
the very heterogeneity of “ADHD.”
The brain space also reflects ethical evaluation of ADHD,
describing the “findings” as volumetric or connectivity
“reductions,” white matter “deficits,” “retarded” maturity,
“abnormality” or “atypical” development. Transferring
normative values to the brain incurs in three problems.
First, components which are no more than normative values
are neutralized as natural. Second, maturity is linked to
age and environment in a disease. Finally, maturity itself is
misunderstood as an autonomous process independent of the
setting, ignoring that “maturation” is not merely a question of
age, but also of what occurs during one’s life.
Conclusion
A critical review of the standard conception of ADHD
has underlined the tautological (rhetorical) reasoning and
assumptions implicit in the causal-explanatory role of the
genome and the brain (metaphysics) which impregnate it. It is
understood that this conception cannot be taken uncritically as
a starting point. Although this review may seem “demolishing,”
it is not everything. Up to here the criticism has been negative
(“demolishing”), not reconstructive (explanatory) of what there
is. After all, ADHD does exist. It is real. Negationist critics
must recognize that ADHD does exist, since we are even
discussing it, though it may be to argue and deny it. The
question now is to see what it is that exists, the way it is
real.
In this respect, we recur to an ontological metascientific and
metatheoretical approach, beyond the facts and terms of the
controversy itself. A new radical approach of this type related
to the fundamental nature of something, and whole considering
the different sides and dimensions of the problem, is found in
Aristotle’s four causes.
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METASCIENCE OF ADHD: ARISTOTLE’S
FOUR CAUSES
Aristotle’s four causes do not refer to empirical or scientific
causes. The terms Aristotle uses in his Physics and Metaphysics,
in which he deals with causes are aition, in plural aitia, which is
where etiology comes from. Aition has a wider sense than cause in
English or Spanish. Aristotle’s causes refer to explanatory factors
or principles that approach “why-questions” in order to explain
why something exists the way it is (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 42). In
any case, “cause” remains the best term to capture the meaning
of Aristotle (Guthrie, 1981, p. 223). In the 21st century, we can
still find refreshing thought in Aristotle for the problems of our
times. In particular, the doctrine of the four causes is still useful
in the “sublunary world” of human things, so the process of
construction (workable materials, shapes, agents, purposes) is not
lost from sight and thus does not fall or remain in mechanicist
causes. The main Aristotelian causes of why, more than mere
empirical causes, enable us to think about how science itself
works, from a metascientific perspective.
Application of the four causes is not common in psychology,
but neither is it unheard of (Killeen, 2001, 2004; Pérez-Álvarez
et al., 2008; Pérez-Álvarez, 2009; Ribes-Iñesta, 2015). In the clinic,
the material cause asks what psychological disorders are made
of, the formal cause asks what shape they take, why they are
that way, the efficient cause asks who makes them that way,
and the final cause asks what purpose they have or what they
are for (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008). Even though the typical
examples of Aristotle’s efficient cause are actors or individual
makers (sculptor, potter), here the possibility of collective actors
or institutional agents (school, family, clinic) is also considered.
The four causes have been specifically applied to ADHD
(Killeen et al., 2012). In spite of being systematic, documented,
and well-argued, the application by Killeen et al. (2012) failed in
important respects. To begin with, it fails by not fitting better to
Aristotle’s original concept, which would have made it of greater
interest. In the end, their application ends up being a mere
reorganization of data from the official neurobiological concept,
and ignores that this concept itself is in question.
The greatest contribution of the four causes might be in
reconsidering the fundamental question of the way in which
ADHD exists. In this article, the application by Killeen et al.
(2012) will be briefly discussed first. In continuation, a new,
more appropriately Aristotelian application is proposed to find
consequences that could reorient the controversy and eventually
overcome it.
Causes without Revelation or Rebellion:
Aristotle for Nothing
Killeen et al. (2012) applied the four causes in the following
order: formal, efficient, material and final, distinguishing in
turn, according to Aristotle, close or molecular (proximate)
and ultimate or molar (distal) causation. The proximate formal
cause of ADHD would be the formal DSM/ICD diagnosis itself.
The ultimate formal cause would be given by the explanatory
theories, typically in terms of executive functions. The proximate
efficient cause would consist, according to Killeen et al. (2012), of
the symptom triggers. They refer to inadequate reinforcement,
processing demand overload (speed, duration, complexity),
inadequate control of context (chaotic, stressful, unpredictable),
boring environments and repetitive tasks. The ultimate efficient
cause refers to the origins of the prenatal syndrome (maternal
smoking, alcohol) and perinatal (head injury, malnutrition,
stressful environment).
The proximate material cause, according to Killeen et al.
(2012), would have to do with neurophysiological substrates,
dynamic brain events and neuromodulatory systems. The
ultimate material cause concerns genetic and epigenetic
conditions, static brain structure and differences in the brain.
The final proximate cause was found by Killeen et al. (2012) in
negative reinforcement (escape from boredom and escape from
mental fatigue) and positive reinforcement (approach novel
stimuli, achieve goals more quickly, peer approval). The final
ultimate cause would be in evolutionary usefulness referring
to historical environmental consequences (new niches) and
adaptive advantages (exploitation of opportunities, escape from
stressful environments).
The application of Killeen et al. (2012) has several problems,
beginning with the order of the causes: formal, efficient, material
and final. The order is not indifferent, because it determines the
interplay and scope of the causes. The logical, chronological and
definitively, ontological would be material, formal, efficient and
final as usually expressed. The material and formal causes go first,
are interdependent on each other and imply the role of the others.
Even when Aristotle gave the most importance to the formal
cause as form, eidos, pattern, that which defines something as
what it is, whether a statue or a bowl, the material as amorphous,
unshaped raw material comes first, the marble in the statue or the
clay in the bowl.
To begin with, the formal cause, which in ADHD, we could
agree with Killeen et al. (2012) is the diagnosis made, means
attributing the diagnosis entity in its own right, when the
diagnosis itself is in question. Without further questioning, the
rest of the causes revolve around the diagnosis, with all its
assumptions, as if we were discussing a well-established clinical
entity. Thus, the proximate efficient cause then becomes a mere
trigger of ADHD symptoms as if it were a natural entity. The
distal efficient cause would be in the perinatal antecedents. But
the true Aristotelian sense of efficient cause refers to “actors”
(individuals or groups) not “factors” or “triggers.” The notion of
antecedent event does not capture the sense of efficient cause as
the builder who builds.
Killeen et al. (2012) found the material cause in the
neurophysiological substrates (proximate cause) and in
supposedly genetic proneness (distal cause). Nevertheless,
this material cause is neither justified by scientific evidence
(according to the discussion in the first part) nor is it
homogeneous with regard to the formal cause. While the
diagnostic form of ADHD is defined by behavior on a molar
scale, the material refers here to neurophysiological substrates
on a molecular scale, a leap of scale also taken with regard
to the efficient cause. While the efficient cause, according to
Aristotle is on the operatory scale due to agents, authors or
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“actors” (not “factors” or “triggers”), the material cause of Killeen
et al. (2012) is on the physicochemical molecular scale. As they
themselves admit, the problems met with are hyperactivity and
inattention (behaviors), not with “ADHD” (Killeen et al., 2012,
p. 415) or in this case, the neurophysiological substrates. The
sculptor and potter work with marble and clay as workable,
moldable materials, not their atomic molecular substrate, which
some may be.
Concerning the final cause, the sense of Killeen et al. (2012) as
positive and negative reinforcement may be assumed. However,
the ADHD fabric has other actors in addition to the person
diagnosed, involving a complex of final causes.
In the end, the application of Killeen et al. (2012) simply
reorganizes the data in a certain way, without suggesting their
ontological status, scientific epistemology, social practice or
political ethics of a complex phenomenon with numerous actors
and interests, not without reason controversial. The causes of
Killeen et al. (2012) are causes which neither reveal nor rebel.
Aristotle’s four causes duly applied could reveal the scientific-
practical tangle with which most convictions and best intentions
sustain ADHD even though lacking in clinical entity and thus
having grounds for a rebellion with cause.
Rebellion with Causes: Unmasking the
ADHD Tangle
The four Aristotelian causes are related to each other in such
a way that it is practically impossible to discuss one without
assuming the others. However, for analytical and explanatory
reasons, it is advisable to go one by one. Specifically, it is
important to begin with the material cause. Not in vain, the
material cause is the raw material from which something is made
(the marble in a statue or the clay in a bowl).
Material Cause
The material cause of ADHD would be the behaviors by which,
in fact, it is defined. It refers to some behaviors of children with
problems in certain tasks and in certain school, family, and social
contexts. These behaviors, typically inattention, hyperactivity
or impulsivity, become conspicuous and end up by defining
a syndrome and the child itself, but in themselves are not
problematic or pathological (“symptoms”), nor do they exhaust
what the child is. Such behaviors attract attention and become
problematic in terms of norms and values (Hawthorne, 2010;
Brinkmann, 2016). But they are not symptoms of any disease,
such as a seizure in epilepsy, trembling hands in Parkinson’s or
the loss of memory in Alzheimer’s. They are part of a person’s
comportment which is not reduced to a few behaviors.
A somewhat problematic distinction in the English language
between comportment and behavior is introduced. In contrast
to the term behavior that usually only captures discrete aspects
of the person, typically symptoms, as is the case in ADHD,
comportment refers to the whole Gestalt of being engaged with
the world. The concept of comportment introduced here captures
the “unifying structure of embodied affective (and cognitive)
engagement with the world, as the most general term to refer
to all-encompassing changes,” (Jacobs et al., 2015, p. 90).
Comportment establishes our constitutive relationship with the
world. This does not refer to an organism or individual separate
from a world they interact with, but a mutually constitutive
relationship in which comportment, specifiable in behaviors for
practical reasons, is the soul and incarnation of this relationship.
The structure of comportment constitutes a situated
functional corporal unit (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963; Thompson,
2007, p. 67). How we are situated is characterized by a
phenomenical structure (perceptive and operatory) from-toward,
from what we pay attention to toward something and then we
operate on it. The human biophysical structure itself propels
both forward and outward, opening way on a horizon of time
and space. As sentient subjects and agents we are embodied,
embedded, and enacted subjects (Thompson, 2007; Fuchs, 2011).
Belonging to the world in this way means that the essential way
we relate to things is neither purely sensory and reflexive, nor
cognitive and intellectual, but bodily and practical, articulated
by “motor intentionality.” This bodily motor intentionality-
environment loop constitutes what Merleau-Ponty calls the
“intentional arch,” which subtends our relationship with the
world integrating sensitivity and motility, perception and action
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 136).
In this phenomenological, existential and behavioral
perspective, behaviors, including those defining ADHD, are
understood according to a circular causality or functional
cycles of perception and movement: interplay, feedback or
reinforcement. Three cycles have been described (Fuchs, 2011):
cycles of organismic self-regulation engendering a basic bodily
sense of self; cycles of sensorimotor coupling between organism
and environment, and cycles of intersubjective interaction. The
problems come up when the functional cycles are somehow
altered, but would not therefore be diseases of the brain (Fuchs,
2011, 2012).
The behaviors by which ADHD is defined begin to
attract attention and even become problematic because
they alter functional cycles, starting with the intersubjective
interaction cycles. A phenomenological study done with ADHD
adults highlighted a certain experience of time and rhythm
characterized by a desynchronized way of being-in-the-world
(Nielsen, 2016). This desynchronization refers to an accelerated
rhythm in thinking, bodily discomfort and even anxiety in
movement that is not in time with the rhythms of others, of
things, of places or of events. An analysis of the different rhythms
of daily life (Lefebvre, 2004) would probably explain many things
before pathologizing the different rhythms and styles.
In brief, the material cause ADHD is made of would consist
of certain behaviors by which in fact it is diagnosed. Within this,
it has been attempted to show that the behaviors forming part
of functional cycles constitute the material itself of psychological
problems (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008; Fuchs, 2012), including
so-called ADHD, in which the problem would be a certain
desynchronized way of being in the world (Nielsen, 2016).
Formal Cause
The formal cause of ADHD would be the formal diagnosis itself
made by the diagnostic systems in use (DSM/ICD), in agreement
with Killeen et al. (2012). It is no longer important that the
diagnosis is more than anything tautological and lacking in
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validity, as discussed above. The diagnosis ends up by becoming
objectivized and obvious, through the process of selection,
definition and magnification of some behaviors over others,
appropriately converted into “symptoms.” ADHD as it is in
common use in school, family, and clinical contexts, as well as
in the media, functions as a model, form or “cultural idiom.” A
cultural idiom is made up of value systems, ways of interpreting,
and epistemological assumptions, all of which structure the way
in which people experience, give meaning to, and react to the
situations they face (Vanthuyne, 2003).
The formal cause includes the theoretical models proposed
for explaining ADHD behaviors (Killeen et al., 2012). Among
the variety of models existing (Kofler et al., 2016) are
those which postulate impaired executive functioning, such as
behavioral inhibition (Barkley, 1997) or monitoring attention
(Brown, 2005). Within their different emphases, they coincide
in understanding the breakdown in executive functioning as
some type of disruption in the brain. The attractiveness of
an explanation in terms of executive functions may be in
the apparent description of neurocognitive mechanisms which
supposedly account for the behavior of individuals, something
doubtless very much in agreement with the individualist,
neuroscientific and biomedical view of our times. However,
in spite of all their neuroscientific sophistication, the notion
of executive function is still a mechanicist, homunculist
explanation, by personifying in an internal Cartesian scenario
what in fact individuals are doing in the real world scenario where
they execute their life. After all, neither the intentions are given
any place in the brain (Schurger and Uithol, 2015), nor is the
supposed breakdown in executive functioning found everywhere
(Brinkmann, 2016; Kofler et al., 2016).
The mechanisms which theoreticians and users of executive
functions hypostasize as if they had a will of their own are
only elements in a wider system in the sense of the structure
of comportment mentioned above (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963)
and its patterns of bodily interaction with the environment
(Maiese, 2012). In its reconsideration of “central executive,”
Michelle Maiese emphasizes the essential role of the affective
framework in which “we interpret persons, objects, facts, states of
affairs, and situations in terms of embodied desiderative feelings.”
“Such framing typically occurs during essentially embodied,
spontaneous subjective experience, prior to conceptual and
propositional information processing, and yields a pre-reflective,
non-conceptual, fine-grained contouring of that world, so that we
immediately can target and focus our attention” (Maiese, 2012,
p. 901).
There may be different forms of bodily harmony with the
surrounding world among individuals and situations and even
within the same individual depending on what attracts their
attention and interests them. This would place the differences
among individuals and within the individual himself more
within an affective framework than neurocognitive abstracts of
a central executive function. In fact, those who are ADHD
are not ADHD all of the time nor everywhere, any more
than by diagnostic prescription. Particular attunement to the
environment, rather than a general breakdown, seems to be the
problem of ADHD.
In short, the formal cause of ADHD would consist of
the diagnosis itself which provides it with entity in its own
right. The diagnosis already functions as a “cultural idiom”
and counts on theoretical models which support it. It has
been attempted to show that the overused model based
on executive functions, far from explaining the supposed
breakdown, returns ADHD to its reconsideration in contextual
affective terms rather than the abstract neurocognitive terms of
the model.
Efficient Cause
The efficient cause of ADHD would consist of social practices
(scientific, clinical, educational, and family) by which certain
behaviors of children or adults (material cause) take the form of
a diagnostic category (formal cause). The efficient cause has to
do rather with the actions of “actors” (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008),
than with risk “factors” as usually understood (Killeen et al.,
2012). Although clinicians are the main “makers” of diagnoses,
they are neither the only agents nor the first. ADHD agency begins
in school and family. But clinicians, parents and educators have
scientific institutions of reference, such as the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) in the USA and the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom,
and associations such as Children and Adults with Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD) which support their
practices. These institutes and associations in turn are based on
scientific research. So it is really scientific research which molds
ADHD (Hawthorne, 2014).
Clinicians epitomize the efficient cause as “official” providers
of the diagnosis. Typically, children referred to them by schools
are taken to the doctor by their parents and are given the
diagnosis and a prescription (Smith, 2013). What happened?
The parents referred to the child’s problems which brought
them there. The clinician (DSM in hand or in mind) asked
questions to confirm that the child had the “symptoms” in the
description. Other “complementary” tests may also have been
applied. Confirmed: the child did have ADHD. In fact, those
behaviors really do exist and are observable. The child is from
now on observed and defined by ADHD behaviors. Everything
else, other behavior, circumstances, contexts or history, remain
outside of the description. The clinician believes he has described
an objective reality, but he has also created it this way by selecting
some behaviors in detriment to others and elevating them to the
category of “symptoms.”
There could be a sort of Charcot effect here (Pérez-Álvarez
and García-Montes, 2007) by which the clinician “generates”
the reality he describes to the extent that the subjects end up
by seeing themselves according to the diagnosis. This looping
effect described by Ian Hacking consists of patients internalizing
the biomedical view of their diagnosis (Hawthorne, 2014, pp.
160–161). The confirmation the clinicians receive from their
patients should not be taken as proof of the objectivity of
the diagnosis. There is nothing more objective in psychiatry
than the grande hystérie (“major hysteria attack”) described
by Charcot (Didi-Huberman, 2004) and which he himself was
really molding with his descriptions, drawings and photographs
(the “neuroimaging” of the time). Once the category has
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been created, it works like an “a priori category” of the
clinician’s understanding, who through his actions (interviews,
tests) reinfluences the patient’s understanding, adopting the
explanations and definitions offered. The creation of the category
itself was already a process of “selection” of the most conspicuous
and operative symptoms to which the problem and the individual
(decontextualized from his history and circumstances) are
reduced, as the Charcot effect suggests (Pérez-Álvarez and
García-Montes, 2007). Now each case confirms the category and
clinical conviction and at the same time is molded to it as the
patient adopts the clinicians point of view if in fact he does not
already have it as a “cultural idiom,” such as ADHD usually is.
Within a dynamic process, the looping effect reaffirms category
and clinician and case and patient or user.
The school itself professes the biomedical conception. As
already occurred in the origins of ADHD starting at the end
of the 1950s with the figure of the school counselor as the
intermediary between the classroom and the clinic (Smith, 2013),
the school staff still acts as a bridge. Textbooks used to train
special education teachers show a strongly biomedical view
(Freedman, 2016). Families also tend to see diverse problems even
without the ADHD diagnosis, canceling out other possibilities
(Lewis-Morton et al., 2014). The influence, if not “pressure” from
the school, along with “information” from parents’ associations
and associations of those affected, beginning with the CHADD,
end up inculcating ADHD in the family, which the clinician only
confirms.
If teachers, parents, and clinicians consult international
reference guidelines such as the NIMH and the NICE, they will
have the impression of a consensus on the biomedical nature
of ADHD which really does not exist (Moncrieff and Timimi,
2013; Erlandsson and Punzi, 2016; Erlandsson et al., 2016). All
in all, the ultimate or first efficient cause is how science molds
the ADHD which then feeds guidelines and their users. As
shown by Hawthorne (2014), science molds ADHD the way it
is by certain patterns of reasoning (epistemology) and research
methods (methodology) which mutually reinforce each other in
a continuous dynamic process.
Although there are a variety of approaches, levels of analysis
and sciences in the study of ADHD, all of them have two
things in common: the object and the method. The object is
the DSM-defined ADHD and the method is some version of
the “scientific method” (Hawthorne, 2014, pp. 47–48). ADHD is
assumed to be a natural, complex entity which must be objectively
described and its mechanisms studied. The proper framework
implicitly involves the ADHD/no-ADHD dichotomy (it would
be stupid to divide the subjects of research repeatedly without
thinking that there are no differences among the groups), as
well as generalization from statistical means, reasoning linking
genetic, neural and behavioral levels, biological reductionism
(“mechanisms”) and the final reification of ADHD as an
identifiable and treatable species (with its subtypes) (Hawthorne,
2014, p. 70).
The lack of firm evidence is supplemented with rhetoric
as already shown above in order to make the reasoning
convincing. Thus, “convergence” of a variety of data are discussed
even when they are not significant and of the need for new
more refined studies, giving the impression of being on the
right track. As Hawthorne (2014, p. 66) points out, “science
builds on previous science; but it is also to say that previous
science constrains current science to some extent—novelty is
not forbidden, just difficult—by imposing a structure of prior
formulation, categorization, and contexts—and tools, techniques,
and experimental models—of interest.” In scientific practice, a
Charcot effect by which research studies what it generates itself
(hypotheses and so forth) in a sort of “collective hysteria” would
not be unthinkable.
Summarizing, the efficient cause of ADHD would be found
in scientific, clinical, educational, and family practices that make
it the way it is. Without denying that it is real, the efficient
cause shows how it becomes real. If it were a natural entity, as
many medical illnesses are (epilepsy, Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s), it
would make no sense to talk about the efficient cause. But neither
because it is not natural is it less real and easier to change. The
genome and the brain may be more plastic than the scientific
practices themselves with their institutionalization, patterns of
reasoning and self-confirmatory methods.
Final Cause
The final cause of ADHD refers to a series of functions which
it meets for a variety of actors and institutions, beyond the
reinforcement of behaviors of those affected (Killeen et al.,
2012). This variety of unintentional functions could explain its
expansion, as well as the conviction with which it is argued
against the “nay-sayers,” in spite of the persistent lack of firm
evidence, as reviewed above. In fact, the success of ADHD may
be due paradoxically to its imprecision: a case of the strength
of vague concepts (Löwy, 1992). As this author says, “Imprecise
concepts may help to link professional domains and to create
alliances between professional groups.” ‘Fuzzy’ terms, continues
the author, may last a lifetime and keep functioning (Löwy, 1992,
p. 373). This is the case of ADHD.
The “trading zone,” which enables imprecise concepts (Löwy,
1992), has its best expression in ADHD as a “semiotic mediator”
as defined by Svend Brinkmann. A semiotic mediator referring
to a diagnosis is a symbolic linguistic device with three
functions: an explanatory function with regard to the problems
experienced, a self-affirming function in the sense that a variety
of phenomena appear as “symptoms” and a disclaiming function
related to responsibility (Brinkmann, 2014b). Semiotic mediation
harmonizes the needs, interests and values that make up the
ADHD complex. According to Hawthorne (2010, 2014), the
solution is reinforced by a positive feedback loop.
A positive feedback loop incorporates values in concepts,
methods and scientific conclusions. As the theme of interest
chosen, research begins by establishing the division between
ADHD and non-ADHD (ADHD versus “controls,” “normal,”
“healthy,” “typical development,” “unaffected”). Based on this
dichotomy, an infinity of topics (“variables”) are chosen to
observe possible neurocognitive correlates and genetic and
behavioral associations. When a “difference” is found, as
Hawthorne says, “the observed difference is only relatively value-
free, having been arrived at through several value-valenced
choices. The slip from “difference” to “dysfunction,” which is an
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ethical term, intensifies the valuation.” Positive results reinforce
the decisions and in any case, as they say, more studies are
necessary, strengthening the feedback loop (Hawthorne, 2014,
p. 136). “Overall, then, the social/scientific feedback loop is self-
reinforcing as long as science achieves results that society can
take up and support. By this ongoing mutual influence, facts
and values are jointly defined and reinforced” (Hawthorne, 2010,
p. 28).
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder harmonizes a
variety of scientific, medical, educational and family interests
besides pharmaceutical industry profits (the most openly
shameless and rightly denounced). The only party harmed seems
to be the children, with the unintentional effect of “accidental
intolerance” of the traits and ADHD-associated behaviors
(Hawthorne, 2014, p.142).
Briefly, the final cause of ADHD would be in harmonizing
the interests of a variety of actors and institutions, not just
the pharmaceutical industry. The particular feedback loop
between science and society in which normative values become
naturalized and legitimated in research, which is valued and
supported by society, has been shown. Perhaps the children are
the least benefited due to the resulting “accidental intolerance.”
Individual differences become dysfunctions, disorder or mental
illness.
CONCLUSION
An argument has been developed in three steps. First, the
evidence claimed which sustains ADHD was reviewed. It was
shown that the diagnosis is based on fallacious reasoning
(tautologies), for lack of clinical proof. At this point, the lack
of specific genetic and neurobiological evidence should not be
surprising, in spite of the enormous amount of literature pointing
in that direction. The fact that the science of ADHD seems to
be going on the right path is probably due more to the rhetoric
and metaphysics of its literature than to accumulated scientific
findings. Rhetoric in use seems to convert ambiguous meager
data into conclusions presented as “convergent evidence,” where
the overused expressions “complex” or “heterogeneous” disorder
really means that its causes are unknown, even if assumed to be
genetic and neurobiological. Implicit metaphysical assumptions
are found for example, in correlates and correlations taken as
neural “causes” or “bases.”
Second, a new metascientific approach to the science of
ADHD was proposed, supposing that a mere critical review leaves
the controversy between “defenders” and “critics” the same as it
was, in a dialog of the deaf. More so, criticism, as demolishing
as it is, still recognizes the sense, persuasion, and good faith, not
ignorance or simple interests, of the defenders. How are they
not going to be convinced if the science they profess directs
their path, sheds light on the subject and offers the method?
The fact is that the science itself may have blind points and self-
confirming methods, without even going down the right path.
The new metascientific approach proposed is Aristotle’s four
causes, material, formal, efficient, and final, as an instrument of
enquiry.
Third, the enquiry was carried out using Aristotle’s four causes.
In addition to a clarifying view, this metascientific focus offers
an alternative to the understanding of “ADHD” beyond the
dominant biomedical model and its simple denial. According
to this analysis, the material of which ADHD is made would
be some specific behaviors which can be problematic in certain
contexts and tasks. These behaviors are easily taken as the form of
the “ADHD” diagnostic category according to diagnostic criteria
in use (typically the DSM). The efficient cause with regard to
what, or better, who makes ADHD the way it is may be found
on one hand in the clinicians who make the diagnosis and on
the other in scientific research which has molded the established
concept. The final cause refers to a variety of functions which
ADHD meets, not in spite of its scientific-clinical vagueness. On
the contrary, it would be precisely due to its imprecision which
makes it useful in a variety of contexts. The positive science-
society feedback loop which surreptitiously combines facts and
values as the reason for its success in harmonizing varied interests
has been shown.
The metascientific perspective makes it possible to see and
go beyond the scientific controversy run aground on whether
ADHD exists or not. According to this analysis, ADHD would
not be sustainable as a clinical entity, although it is still real as
a practical entity (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008). Far from being
a given natural kind, out there, ready for its research as a
scientific object, “ADHD” would be a practical kind, constructed
on the scientific and clinical practices themselves, fulfilling a
variety of functions, who knows for whom or at what cost.
Beyond the positivist science framework (typically neuroscience),
the “number one recommendation” would be to “establish a
pragmatist framework that carefully uses facts and values in all
decisions and actions relevant to ADHD” (Hawthorne, 2014,
p. 176). As a scientifically and ethically coherent derivation, the
“ADHD”/non-“ADHD” dichotomy would have to be overcome,
and instead of the essentialist conception in use, adopt a
pragmatic approach with regard to situations and concrete
norms where the problem can be enacted according to a
cultural, contextual, existential psychology (Brinkmann, 2016,
p. 88).
Therefore, the problems to which “ADHD” refers should
never have left the family and school educational scope, making
them pass through the clinical circuit and come back as “mental
disorder.” Any problems related to “attention,” “activity,” and
“impulsivity” are not outside learning as aspects of development
of self-control. Some children may require additional “training”
(not treatment). More precisely, such “training” would be by
parents and teachers with a view to promoting the skills children
require. Training by parents using common games involving
attention and following rules (“Simon says,” “frozen dance”)
as well as behavioral principles (availability of appropriate
contexts, positive reinforcement), would “remove” children from
(risk of receiving the diagnoses of) “ADHD” (Charach et al.,
2013; Laber-Warren, 2014). A study with a careful design
showed that behavioral training by parents and teachers was
more effective than medication (Pelham et al., 2016). These
behavioral “interventions,” more than as an alternative to
medication (which is no small thing), are referred to here as
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 928
fpsyg-08-00928 June 7, 2017 Time: 17:42 # 12
Pérez-Álvarez The Four Causes of ADHD
an ontological argument demonstrating the practical behavioral
nature (non-essentialist) of ADHD. It is already time to
overcome the “ADHD”/non-“ADHD” dichotomy without paying
attention to the aspect of the problem when necessary without
pathologizing it. Since the diagnostic language is not inevitable,
only dominant,
We must supplement the pragmatic interest in action possibilities
[afforded by different languages inherent in social practices
(e.g., existential, moral, political)] with a hermeneutic interest in
interpreting the person and her suffering in her life situation as it
presents itself in its “facticity” (Brinkmann, 2014a, p. 645).
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